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Abstract 
 
The paper derives operating and financial measures of leverage and tests their 
association with market based measures of equity risk. It is the first such study to use 
purely accounting-based data to derive the leverage measures. In line with previous 
literature it conducts a new test on the relative importance of operating and financial 
leverage. The results suggest that operating costs have a greater impact. 
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The Association between Accounting and Market-Based Risk Measures 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The paper examines the proposition that the underlying cost structure of the firm 
explains the systematic risk of its cash flow and the consequent behaviour of the 
firm’s stock price. Whilst the intuition of this relationship may seem self-evident, it 
has been the subject of relatively little empirical research. Systematic risk arises 
because the firm is the subject of fixed claims but faces variable revenues (Huffman, 
1983). The fixed claims associated with debt finance have attracted the attention of 
the majority of research into the nature of leverage based adjustments of systematic 
risk. For Modigliani and Miller, (1963) and Miller, (1977) the underlying asset beta or 
risk class of the all equity firm is specified in advance. In the standard corporate 
finance text, the asset beta is computed from the market-based equity beta adjusting 
for leverage effects (Watson and Head, 1998). A likely much larger class of fixed 
claims however arises from the general operating costs of the business and this has 
attracted relatively little attention (an exception is Rosett, 2003). A possible important 
reason for these biases in the research agenda is the dominance of finance over 
accounting based perspectives in the analysis of systematic risk. Theoretical analyses 
use financial market data in conjunction with accounting data to develop operating 
leverage variables (Gahlon and Gentry, 1982, Huffman, 1983). Similarly empirical 
studies using operating leverage have unanimously incorporated market numbers in 
their measures of operating leverage (for example, Hamada, 1972, Mandelker and 
Rhee, 1984, Huffman, 1989, Rosett, 2003). Instead, this paper uses exclusively 
accounting data, using company accounts and national income statistics.  
It then presents an empirical test examining the relative impact on market 
based systematic risk of operating and financial leverage variables derived using 
comparable profit and loss account data. An important empirical question is the 
relative impact of different cost categories on total systematic risk. If, by extension of 
Modigliani and Miller (1958), variance in total cash flow is a function of the presence 
of not just interest based, but all fixed charges, it would seem logical to expect 
operating leverage to account the more strongly for the firm’s systematic risk. Of the 
small number of studies that have examined the joint and complementary effects of 
operating and financial leverage, few have examined the quantitative impacts of 
 2
differing categories of fixed costs on a systematic basis. An exception is Lord (1996) 
whose empirical study focuses on three sectors and ends with a call for further 
research in wider contexts. Moreover, in the international context, including the focus 
of this study, the United Kingdom, recent evidence is particularly limited. 
 The examination of operating leverage in the UK and international context is 
particularly interesting for a number of reasons. First, it provides a mechanism for 
linking the stock price return to the underlying short-run cost structure of the firm. 
The presence of certain costs, such as knowledge-based labour, research or capital 
intensive activities, and scale based production, which have been linked to 
competitive advantage (Grant, 1996, Lazonick, 1991) may also lead to the creation of 
fixed cost structures that promote shareholder risk. A further rationale has emerged 
from recent changes in corporate behaviour, associated with the rise of the notions of 
the flexible firm and flexible labour markets and their impact on underlying cost 
behaviour (Armstrong, 2002), which may be expected to attenuate stock market risk. 
All previous studies predate the major impacts of these changes in the 1990s and the 
final reason is therefore that earlier empirical findings might be open to question. This 
is particularly the case in the United Kingdom, where the impact of these ideas has 
been at least as great if not greater than in the United States. Further work is of 
particular value given the major direction of institutional reforms in the UK recently 
with the objectives of de-regulation and the creation of more flexible markets. 
Consequently a related reason is that theories of competitive advantage suggest a 
degree of managerial discretion in asset acquisition and that operating leverage does 
not merely reflect industry membership (Brigham and Gapenski, 1994). A third 
reason is that where managers are committed to high fixed cost investment, they 
might exercise greater caution in the borrowing decision. Interactions between 
operating and financial leverage are therefore potentially important.  
To examine these issues in more detail, the remainder of the paper is organised 
as follows. The next section introduces an alternative perspective on accounting based 
risk measurement and then reviews the prior literature, particularly concentrating on 
previous empirical analyses of operating leverage. Subsequent sections describe the 
hypotheses, data, and results. A final section draws conclusions.  
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2. ACCOUNTING NUMBERS AND MARKETS RISK: THEORETICAL AND 
EMPIRICAL APPROACHES 
Accounting based measures of financial risk 
Because the variability of the firm’s profits is a function of the firm’s underlying cost 
structure, systematic shareholder risk depends on the ratio of fixed to total cost. At the 
aggregate this relationship is captured through gearing or leverage. It has two major 
components, the degree of financial leverage (DFL) and the degree of operating 
leverage (DOL). DFL depends on the degree of fixed interest charges that must be 
paid irrespective of the level of profit. For the purposes of this analysis, it is defined 
as the rate of change in profit after interest divided by the rate of change in profit 
before interest. DOL is defined as the rate of change in profits before interest divided 
by the rate of change in sales. DOL can be used to compute an ‘operating’ or ‘asset’ 
beta by relating the proportion of fixed cost to total cost for one particular firm to the 
proportion of fixed cost to total cost for all firms.  
The intuition of this approach is exactly the same as the adjustment of the cost 
of capital for the presence of fixed interest charges (Modigliani and Miller (1958, 
Hamada, 1972). Further analytical models (Lev, 1974, Gahlon and Gentry, 1982, 
Huffman, 1983 and Mandelker and Rhee, 1984) extend this relationship to include 
risk measures that depend jointly on underlying accounting and market numbers. In 
one view financial managers facing high DOL risk can deliberately adopt financial 
plans that involve low DFL to achieve an appropriate level of total stock risk. The 
hypothesis implies that changes in DOL and DFL are independent of each other and 
that total leverage is a product of DOL and DFL. The DOL and DFL non-interaction 
view is criticised by Huffman (1983), emphasising the endogenous nature of the 
capacity decision of the firm. Using an option pricing approach, she assumed that the 
commitment to fixed capacity investment depends on the ex ante debt level. Therefore 
the capacity decision attenuates the increase in equity risk caused by an increase in 
business risk but that the attenuating ability decreases as either revenue declines or the 
level of outstanding debt increases. Also the capacity decision partially offsets the 
effect of a debt increase on stock risk insofar as the debt is below a critical level. 
Huffman’s approach seems correct as far as total risk is concerned and is confirmed 
by empirical tests (Li and Henderson, 1991), but less appealing as far as systematic 
risk is concerned. Debt increases themselves appear exogeneous in Huffman’s 
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formulation, but are more likely in reality to be associated with decisions to increase 
capacity. Moreover, capacity alterations, where endogenous, are the subject of 
intermittent decisions difficult to observe by market analysts, and are more likely to 
be attributable to unsystematic changes. On the other hand variables that are more 
likely to be systematically endogeneous include structural supply and labour market 
conditions, which can be fixed or varied in response to the ex ante debt level.  
The accounting Beta (βac) as derived from global OG decomposes into specific 
betas by Cost (C) type C1…n and a Sales Beta (βs): 
 
 βac =  βc1 *  βc2 * βs         (1) 
 
Interest costs arising from financial gearing comprise one of these cost categories. The 
formulation in (1) is similar to the reconciliation of real asset risk and market risk by 
Gahlon and Gentry (1982, p.17): 
 
 CV(π) = DOL * DFL *CV(REV)      (2) 
 
Where CV(π) and CV(REV) are respectively the co-efficients of variation of profit and 
revenue. Equations (1) and (2) are consistent because the classes of beta in (1) are 
defined as DOL(C)i/DOL(C)m, (etc) where i = the firm and m = all firms.1
In contrast to prior literature, the argument in the present paper is that equation 
(1) wholly and exclusively accounts for ex post systematic risk. Ex ante systematic 
risk depends on the forecast expectations of relative rates of change in cost and 
revenue categories by firm insiders and market participants. Where firms use rational 
planning such expectations will be built into budget forecasts.  
The relationship between global systematic risk and individual cost categories 
suggests that the weight of each category relative to total cost will have a 
proportionate impact on the overall beta. The empirical section of the paper tests this 
intuition by examining the relative aggregate impact of interest based and other fixed 
costs. Using data obtained from the National Accounts (UKNA, 2005, 3.1.1 and 3.1.3, 
pp.121-22) suggests of total costs of £1003bn deducted from total resources to arrive 
at operating surplus for non-financial corporations, the estimated proportionate fixed 
cost in 2002 is £158bn (16%).2  Interest charges for 2002 were £37bn. In short, it is 
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possible that non-interest related fixed costs are approximately four times the level of 
interest based fixed costs. Such an estimate may seem reasonable if it is borne in mind 
that other fixed costs include for example wages and salaries, which are often both 
material and fixed in contractual terms at least in the relatively short run and are more 
often based on time rates than piece rates. Nonetheless the relative impact of these 
categories is a currently unanswered empirical question and is addressed below in the 
review of prior empirical literature and in the subsequent tests. 
 
 
Prior empirical literature 
Prior empirical studies have concentrated mainly on financial leverage. In the 
minority of empirical studies that have considered both operating and financial 
leverage elements, it has been assumed and to some extent proven that they have 
equal or complementary effect on total risk. The evidence, albeit limited, shows that 
where their effects are compared, operating leverage has equal or greater importance 
compared to financial leverage (Lev, 1974, Mandelker and Rhee, 1984, Li and 
Henderson (1991). Evidence from these studies is based on a wide variety of methods 
for estimating operating and financial leverage and predates many structural changes 
affecting the US, UK and other economies.  
There is limited and contradictory empirical evidence on the relationship 
between financial leverage and beta. Hamada (1972) found that approximately a 
quarter of the observed cross-sectional variation in a stock’s beta could be explained 
by the DFL of the underlying firm. Further empirical evidence of the association 
between the DFL and beta was also reported by several other studies that applied and 
extended the risk-decomposition method (Hill and Stone 1980; Chance, 1982, and 
Mohr, 1985). However, a few researchers have failed to detect a significant positive 
effect of DFL on beta (Thompson, 1976; Chung, 1989). These equivocal results may 
be the result of the relatively small proportion of fixed costs accounted for by interest 
charges or the variation in methods used to estimate financial leverage. 
Early studies examining the role of accounting beta found considerable 
support for a positive relationship between operating leverage and systematic risk 
(Beaver, Kettler and Scholes, 1970, Beaver and Manegold, 1975, Gonedes 1973, 1975 
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Hill and Stone, 1980). Lev (1974) also found empirical support for his model from a 
sample of firms in electric utility, steel, and oil industries. As noted by Chung (1989), 
there are limitations in Lev’s approach and conclusion because the method of cost 
decomposition employed may suffer serious measurement problems. Moreover, Lev 
(1974) included interest expenses in his definition of fixed costs, which made it 
difficult to separate the pure effect of the DOL. More recently, Rosett (2003) found 
only a weak relationship between total market risk and operating leverage, finding 
instead that labour cost leverage was a more important variable. Although these 
results are interesting, and form the basis for further research using decompositions of 
operating leverage, the purpose of the present paper is to examine the impact purely 
the accounting derived measures of operating and financial leverage on systematic 
market risk. 
In other studies, variation in the operating risk component has been typically 
explained in terms of the diversification of business activities across segments which 
themselves have differing levels of industry risk. Underlying asset betas are estimated 
with reference to stock market returns for the appropriate industry segment 
(Rubinstein, 1973, Fuller and Kerr, 1981), which are then adjusted or not to take 
account of the impact of firm specific debt (Butler et al, 1991). A problem with this 
approach is that underlying operating risk is derived from observable market risk. 
Where betas are particularly useful to corporate managers, for example in evaluating 
divisional investment opportunities, it is intuitively more appealing to begin with an 
analysis of the underlying cost structure and its variation.  
Several other studies have examined the joint impact of the operating leverage 
ratio on aggregate beta, usually in conjunction with the financial leverage ratio 
(Gahlon and Gentry, 1982, Mandelker and Rhee, 1984, Huffman, 1989, Darrat and 
Mukherjee 1995, Li and Henderson 1991, Lord, 1996). These studies have confirmed 
the importance of operating leverage relative to financial leverage. At the same time 
their empirical focus is quite narrow (US-based, industry and time specific) and is 
suggestive of the value of new studies in the wider international and UK context.  
Also the interpretation of their results has been problematic. In their empirical 
test of the explanatory power of the DOL and DFL, Mandelker and Rhee (1984) 
found the two variables explained a considerable proportion of the variation in beta at 
portfolio level. Especially when instrumental variables were used for portfolio 
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grouping, DOL and DFL accounted for 38 to 48% of cross-sectional variation of 
betas. Further, there was significant correlation between DOL and DFL, suggesting 
that firms trade-off between DOL and DFL. Although the hypothesised positive 
relationships between DOL and DFL and stock risk are theoretically sound more 
recent evidence questions the robustness of these relationships. Huffman (1989) 
discovered negative relationship between systematic risk and DOL (the opposite of 
Mandelker and Rhee’s findings). Also, he found no support for the negative 
correlation between DOL and DFL observed by Mandelker and Rhee (1984). Li and 
Henderson (1991) found that while DOL was significant, only a weak positive beta-
DFL relationship was detected. An interaction term between the two leverage 
measures, included to test Huffman’s (1983) hypothesis, was found to be significantly 
related to total risk at the 90% confidence level, but not to beta. Darrat and Mukherjee 
(1995), employing a causality approach that differs from the common correlation 
technique, also found support for Huffman’s (1983) model. By contrast, Lord’s 
(1996) study did not confirm the impact of an interrelationship between DOL and 
DFL on total, unsystematic and systematic risk, as implied by Huffman (1983). Lord 
(1996) also reported significant positive correlation between DOL and the three risk 
measures. DFL, however, was significantly related to total and unsystematic risk, but 
not systematic risk. 
One important reason for the inconsistency in empirical evidence of the 
relationship between DOL and DFL and stock risk may be the problem in finding the 
correct measurements of the two types of leverage. The most commonly used proxy 
for DOL is the ratio of the percentage change in earning before interest and tax 
(EBIT) to the percentage change in sales, estimated by regressing EBIT on sales 
through time. However where sales are growing, simple time-series regression 
techniques capture growth rather than leverage (O’Brien and Vanderheiden, 1987). As 
an alternative, they suggest a two-stage time-series regression technique to eliminate 
the pattern in the growth of sales. The regression techniques require lengthy 
estimation periods for reliability and at the same time must assume that underlying 
assumption is nonetheless that DOL and DFL stay unchanged during the estimation 
period.3 Furthermore, as Dugan et al. (1994) observed, the assumption of constant 
leverage causes the test of the DOL-DFL trade-off hypothesis to be inconsistent in 
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itself because this hypothesis implies that the two measures can change as corporate 
managers attempt to create a balanced total risk. 
To avoid these problems, the current paper uses the point-to-point estimates of 
DOL and DFL averaged out over the same period as the beta estimation period. Lord 
(1996) is one of a few authors who employed the point-to-point estimate approach but 
he did not state whether or not the estimates are averaged out over the same period for 
beta estimation. However, like other estimate techniques, the point to point approach 
still has possible problems arising from price effects (i.e. using sales rather than 
output figures) and discrepancies in accounting methods as suggested by Huffman 
(1989). However the major advantage as far as the current study is concerned is that it 
can be applied consistently with the cost category decomposition approach discussed 
above. Such an approach is also consistent with equation (2) above, so that DOL is 
based on changes in EBIT and sales and DFL is based on changes in Earnings before 
tax (EBT) and EBIT. Total leverage is therefore change in EBT divided by change in 
sales. 
Overall the literature suggests that theoretically, DOL and DFL are strongly 
related to beta and total risk but empirically the leverage-risk relationship is not so 
strong. The difficulty in identifying the true measures of DOL and DFL is probably 
one important reason for such inconsistency. The theoretical review has stressed the 
possibility of using purely accounting data to gain further insight into the nature of 
systematic risk. The expectation is that DOL will be of greater relative importance to 
DFL as a determinant of beta. Consistent use of accounting data also helps to 
overcome inconsistencies in the empirical literature, which have not used precise 
accounting based point to point estimates. In addition the different UK context has the 
potential to provide further insight into the leverage-risk relationship. 
 
 
3. HYPOTHESES AND DATA 
3.1 Model and variable definition  
In this section the models to be tested are introduced based on the discussion above.  
The general model follows from equation (2) above with the addition of appropriate 
control variables: 
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 β = a0 + a1OLBETA + a2FLBETA + a3SBETA+ a4G + a5S + a6,1D1 + a6,2D2 + …  
+ a6,n-1Dn-1 + e         (4) 
 
Where β is the 2003 firm beta factor obtained from Datastream. OLBETA is the 
operating leverage beta, defined as DOL(C)i/DOL(C)m, where i = the firm and m = all 
firms, and where DOL = %∆X / %∆S and  %∆X and  %∆S are the percentage changes 
in earnings before interest and tax and in sales respectively, both of which are 
obtained from Datastream. The percentage changes are computed using data from 
1997 to 2003 inclusive to compute ratios for 1998 to 2003 and then averaged. 
FLBETA is calculated in a comparable fashion and derived from DFL, where DFL = 
%∆Y/%∆X and Y is the earnings after interest and before tax and X is EBIT. Using this 
method the impact of fixed cost characteristics in the firm’s interest charges is more 
easily isolated. Such charges are directly comparable with similar charges deducted in 
arriving at EBIT and therefore included in the DOL measure. In other words DOL and 
DFL represent directly comparable fixed cost estimators using profit and loss account 
data.  
Sales beta, growth rates, size, and industry membership (SBETA, G,  S, D1..n) 
are control variables. SBETA is the rate of change in the firm’s sales turnover relative 
to the rate of change in sales turnover for all firms. Data for the latter were obtained 
from the UKNA (2005, 3.1.1 and 3.1.3, pp.121-22). The computation method is the 
same as OLBETA. Growth rates (G) refer to equity growth and are calculated as G = 
Et/ Et-1 where G is the growth rate and E is the equity capital (balance sheet called up 
share capital plus total reserves). According to the predictions of the standard CAPM 
and dividend growth model formulations, growth is an important determinant of 
equity beta.4 Size (S) is measured by market capitalisation, which is the product of the 
market price and the total number of shares outstanding. All the above measures are 
simple five-year averages for the years 1999-2003 inclusive. There are significant 
effects of industry group on beta even after controlling for the underlying firm’s 
balance sheet characteristics (Rosenberg and Guy, 1976), and some sectors are more 
or less insulated from general economic events (Rosenberg and Rudd, 1982). To 
capture these effects, the sample was grouped into industry sectors most likely to pick 
up these effects, for example cyclical and non-cyclical (CYC and NCYC), basic, 
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utilities and resources (BASIC, UTIL, RESOR) and information technology (ITECH). 
Taken together the control variables coupled with FLBETA provide a parallel test of 
the conventional view of the CAPM determinants of beta. 
The interpretation of the OLBETA and FLBETA co-efficients is a test of the 
principal proposition of the paper; that DOL will have greater positive impact on beta 
relative to DFL. In terms of formal hypotheses:  
 
HI: The degree of operating leverage is positively related to beta (a1 > 0)  
HII: The degree of financial leverage is positively related to beta (a2 > 0)  
HIII: The degree of operating leverage has a greater impact on beta relative to the 
degree of financial leverage (a1 > a2) 
 
3.2.  Sample and data 
To be included in the initial sample, a company was required to satisfy several 
selection criteria. It must be in the FTSE all share index throughout the period of 
study. It must have data for beta, industry code, market value, sales, EBIT, profit after 
interest before tax, and equity,5 available for the entire period from 1998 – 2003 so 
that DOL, DFL, growth and size can be computed. Firms with negative DOL and DFL 
values were excluded from the sample. Table 1 summarises the sampling process. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
 
Once the initial sample was obtained for the firms satisfying the above criteria, each 
variable was examined for normality. All variables except beta and industry dummies 
were log transformed to achieve closer proximity to normality. The sample 
accommodated some firms with negative growth rates by indexing growth to 1, but in 
a minority of cases where growth rates were greater than minus 100% they were 
necessarily excluded from the log transformed variable. Descriptive statistics for the 
sample firms are shown in table 2. 
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Table 2 about here 
 
 
As table 2 panel A shows, the distribution of most of the variables remained 
problematic, even once these transformations were accommodated. Non-normality of 
individual variables is not necessarily problematic for the ordinary least-squares 
(OLS) model, provided the residuals are normal. Shapiro-Wilk tests were conducted 
on the residuals of all relevant models and in general these showed approximation to 
normality (table 3). All OLS regression models incorporated White’s (1980) 
heteroscedasticity consistent matrix for standard errors and all models were re-tested 
using non-parametric quantile regressions. The final model tested, taking into account 
the log (LN) transformations was: 
 
β = a0 + a1OLBETA + a2FLBETA +a3SBETA + a4LNG + a5LNS + a6,1D1 + a6,2D2 + 
… + a6,n-1Dn-1 + e 
 (4)
 
Table 2 panel B shows significant cross correlations between a minority of variables, 
most notably between the cyclical and other industry groupings. To deal with the 
effects of potential multi-collinearity the CYC variable was dropped from the model 
and the remaining co-efficients analysed in its absence. A similar procedure was 
adopted to assess the impact of interactions between LNOLBETA, LNG and LNS. 
Mean VIFs for all models tested were <1.5. 
Finally, to test the possible interrelationship between the two types of 
leverage, an interaction term (LNOLBETA*LNFLBETA) was added to the model. This 
method has been used by Li and Henderson (1991) and Lord (1996) and provides a 
supplementary test of Huffman’s (1983) interaction hypothesis. 
 
Table 3 about here 
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4. DISCUSSION 
The results of the regressions are reported in table 3. These show the full model set 
out in equation (4) above and variations in models A-D illustrating the specific 
impacts of variables important to the above hypothesis. As a robustness check, models 
E and F report the impact of these key variables using a non-parametric quantile 
regression specification.  
Overall the models explained between 35% and 40% of cross sectional 
variation in beta, which is consistent with previous similar studies (Mandelker and 
Rhee, 1984). The LNOLBETA variable was significant in all models tested, whereas 
LNFLBETA is not. The evidence therefore supports hypotheses I and III but not 
hypothesis II. The significance of LNOLBETA was robust when non-parametric model 
specification was used in models (e) and (f). LNOLBETA was significant at only the 
5% level in the absence of the SBETA variable. In contrast, LNFLBETA had a 
negative sign and was insignificant regardless of model specification. The interaction 
term (LNOLBETA*LNFLBETA) was also insignificant and with a negative sign, 
confirming the results of prior studies. However, if this variable is treated as a direct 
test of Huffman’s (1983) negative interaction hypothesis, it is supported at the 5% 
significance level.  
To examine the reasons for the apparent insignificance of LNFLBETA, further 
sensitivity tests were conducted. A possibility, again suggested by Huffman (1983) 
and Li and Henderson (1991) is that financial leverage is only important if debt 
exceeds a certain critical level. To test this hypothesis the sample was split at the 
median point and the models re-tested on a sub-sample of firms with above average 
financial leverage (n=78). The notable differences in these tests were that LNFLBETA 
was positive and significant at the 5% level in a simple regression model. It was also 
significant at that level when SBETA and LNS were added to the model. In the 
presence of LNOLBETA*LNFLBETA significance reduced to 10% and disappeared 
altogether when industry dummies were added. Overall, the evidence therefore 
constitutes only very weak support for hypothesis II, suggesting that financial 
leverage only affects beta in very specific circumstances. 
SBETA was significant in all models tested, and in general added to the 
significance of the LNOLBETA variable when used in conjunction. So although the 
conjunction of fixed costs and sales revenue variation are important, they need to be 
 13
flexed to account for the variation in revenue relative to changes in aggregate demand. 
Of the other control variables, growth was insignificant in all the models tested, 
whereas size was always strongly and positively significant. Of the industry variables, 
only ITECH, NCYC and UTIL were consistently influential. ITECH was positive and 
significant suggesting this sector of relatively new firms had higher betas, but also 
cross sectional variation in the sector is also important regardless of industry norms. 
This would also seem to be the case for NCYC and UTIL, although in these cases 
betas are significantly below average. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The results confirm the importance of operating leverage in the determination of 
systematic risk. In this respect the analysis confirms the consensus from similar 
previous empirical studies (Mandelker and Rhee, 1984, Huffman, 1989, Darrat and 
Mukherjee 1995, Li and Henderson 1991, Lord, 1996). Financial leverage was not 
important although there is some evidence in support of the notion of capacity trade 
off and, in very specific circumstances, critical levels of financial leverage (Huffman, 
1983). So whereas operating fixed costs have the bigger impact on systematic risk, 
interest costs arising from financial leverage contribute towards the mitigation of 
managerial commitment to those fixed costs.  
The role of operating leverage in the theoretical and empirical analysis has 
important implications for risk management and asset allocation within the firm and 
for the pricing of risk financial markets. The suggestion arising from the alternative 
approach in this paper is that the ‘conventional’ method, which identifies a quoted 
company already engaged in the proposed line of business and adjusts its beta by 
ungearing and regearing (Watson and Head, p.254), is the wrong approach. There are 
well known several problems such as the reliance on historical share price variation 
(usually over a five year period), the empirical question marks over the performance 
of stock market beta in explaining returns (Fama and French, 1992,1996). Empirical 
research shows that equity beta does not substantially explain the cross section of 
stock market returns, whereas these alternative factors might. Moreover, one might 
question the logic of management accounting, which in using market-based betas in 
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cost of capital calculations, ignores the beta values implied by its own budgeting 
assumptions. 
The linear relationship between operating cost and stock market beta suggest 
there is a security market line equivalent representing the underlying fixed costs of the 
business. Corporate managers committing their firms to high fixed cost investment, 
therefore face a higher cost of capital. Insofar as competitive advantage depends on 
making such investments, there is a clear trade-off in terms of higher expected returns 
and the alternative strategy of flexibility.   
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 Table 1. Sample selection process 
 
Number of firms in the FTSE ALL SHARE Index 685
Number of firms without beta data (30)
Number of firms without complete data for sales, EBIT, 
after-tax profit, employment costs and equity available for 
the entire period 1998-2003 
(285)
Number of firms with negative or error DOL and DFL 
values 
(178)
Initial sample 192
Outliers and large negative growth firms (36)
Final sample 156
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics  
   
Panel A: Variable descriptors 
 
 
   
Variable Mean Std Skew Kurtosis swilk  
  Dev   Prob>z 
 
 
BETA 0.915 0.355 0.190 2.938 0.396 
LNOLBETA 0.975 1.371 0.179 3.066 0.052 
LNFLBETA 0.063 0.389 -1.335 6.793 0.000 
SBETA 4.200 6.616 2.905 16.215 0.000 
LNG 0.156 0.206 0.936 5.725 0.000 
LNS 6.054 1.331 0.596 2.693 0.000 
CYCL 0.500  
GENIN 0.096  
ITECH 0.045  
NCYC 0.109  
RESOR 0.026  
UTIL 0.032  
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Panel B: Correlation matrix 
BETA LNOLBETA LNFLBET
A 
SBETA LNS LNG
CYCL 
GENIN ITECH NCYC RESOR UTIL
BETA 1  0.197**0.051 0.076 -0.266*** 0.045 -0.274***
LNOLBETA 0.139 1  -0.117 0.050 0.093 0.061 0.082 0.006
LNFLBETA -0.004 -0.037 1 0.128 -0.080 -0.032 -0.071 -0.099 -0.030 
SBETA 0.126 -0.255*** -0.007 1 -0.023 0.053 0.072 -0.127 0.102 -0.036
LNS 0.187** 0.017 -0.059 -0.04 1  -0.163** -0.051 -0.118 0.1788** 0.054 0.220***
LNG 0.107 -0.256*** 0.042 0.444***
 
-0.097 1 0.133 0.001 0.124 -0.059 -0.071 -0.114
CYCL  -0.216***1 -0.326** -0.347*** -0.162** -0.182**
GENIN  -0.070
 
1 -0.114 -0.052 -0.059
ITECH 1 -0.075 -0.035 -0.039
NCYC 1 -0.056 -0.063
RESOR 1 -0.029
UTIL 1
 
 
 
 
 
 
*** indicates significance P < 0.01 
** indicates significance P < 0.05 
 
Pearson correlation co-efficients are shown in the left half of the matrix and Spearman co-efficients for non-continuous variables are shown in the right half. 
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Table 2: Determinants of equity beta   
    
Dependent variable = beta   
  Model   
  (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
Independent variable   
       
LNOLBETA  0.044*** 0.043*** 0.046*** 0.036** 0.049** 0.040** 
  (2.396) (2.468) (2.704) (1.730) (1.780) (1.920) 
LNFLBETA  -0.052     
  (0.756)     
LNOLBETA*    -0.094**   
LNFLBETA    (1.788) 
 
  
SBETA  0.007** 0.007*** 0.008***   
  (1.806) (2.587) (2.669)   
LNG  0.130     
  (0.170)     
LNS  0.109*** 0.107*** 0.110***   
  (5.450) (5.507) (5.703)   
CYCL  0.006     
  (0.13)     
GENIN  0.071     
  (0.840)     
ITECH  0.357*** 0.350*** 0.353***   0.424***
  (3.510) (3.670) (3.962)   (3.040)
NCYC  -0.406*** -0.409*** -0.424***   -0.350***
  (3.990) (4.217) (4.909)   (3.820)
RESOR  -0.110     
  (1.54)     
UTIL  -0.854*** -0.846*** -0.932***   -0.771***
  (6.730) (7.644) (6.405)   (5.190)
CONS  0.221 0.246 0.233 0.880*** 0.854*** 0.889***
  (1.680) (2.052)*** (1.988)*** (25.320) (18.300) (23.730)
       
N  156 156 156 156 156 156
F  11.700 22.140 18.850 4.720  
R-squaredI  0.396 0.387 0.409 0.029 0.018 0.139
Ramsey RESETii  0.244 0.472 0.339 0.572  
S-Wilkiii  
 
 0.090 0.084 0.219 0.614  
 
 
 
Notes: i Adjusted r-square in models (A)-(D), which are specified as ordinary least squares, and psuedo 
in (E) –(F) which use median regression. 
ii P-Value 
iii P-value of the Shapiro-Wilk test of normality on regression residuals. 
 
Bracketed figures are t-values, and in models (A)-(D) are based on White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity-
consistent variance matrix. They are based two tailed tests for dichotomous industry variables and on 
one-tailed tests for the continuous and interaction variables.  
 
 19
 
REFERENCES 
 
Armstrong, P. (2002), ‘The costs of activity-based management’, Accounting 
Organizations and Society, 27(1/2), pp. 99-120. 
 
Beaver, W.H., Kettler, P., and Scholes, M., (1970), “The Association Between Market 
Determined and Accounting Determined Risk Measures,” Accounting Review 
45, 654-82. 
 
Beaver, W. and Manegold, J, (1975), “The association between market-Determined 
and Accounting-Determined Measures of Systematic Risk: Some Further 
Evidence,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 231-284. 
 
Brearley, R. and Myers, S. (1996) Principles of Corporate Finance, McGraw Hill. 5th 
Ed. 
 
Brenner, M. and Smidt, S., (1978), “Asset Characteristics and Systematic Risk,” 
Financial Management, 33-39. 
 
Brigham, E.F. and Gapenski, L.C. (1994), Financial Management: Theory and 
Practice, 7th edition, Dryden Press Fuller, R.J and Kerr, H.S. (1981), 
‘Estimating the divisional cost of capital: the pure-play technique, Journal of 
Finance, pp.997-1009. 
 
Butler, K.C. Mohr, R. M and Simonds, R.R. (1991), ‘The Hamada and Conine 
leverage adjustments and the estimation of systematic risk,’ Journal of 
Business Finance and Accounting, 18, pp.885-902.  
 
Chance, D., (1982), “Evidence on a Simplified Model of Systematic Risk,” Financial 
Management 11, 53-63. 
 
Chung, K.H., (1989), “The Impact of the Demand Volatility and Leverages on the 
Systematic Risk of Common Stocks,” Journal of Finance and Accounting 
16(3), 343-360. 
 20
Claus, J. and Thomas, J. (2001), ‘Equity Premia as Low as Three Percent? Evidence 
from Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts for Domestic and International Stock 
Markets’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 55, No. 5, 1629-66. 
 
Dugan, M.T., Minyard, D.H., and Shriver, K.A., (1994), “A Re-Examinantion of the 
Operating Leverage-Financial Leverage Tradeoff Hypothesis,” Quarterly 
Review of Economics and Finance 34(3), 327-334 
 
Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French, (1996), Multifactor explanations of Asset 
Pricing Anomalies, Journal of Finance, 51, 55-84. 
 
Fuller, R.J. and Kerr H.S. (1981), ‘Estimating the divisional cost of capital: an 
analysis of the pure play technique, Journal of Finance, 36,5, 997-210. 
 
Gahlon, J.M. and Gentry, J.A., (1982), “On the Relationship Between Systematic 
Risk and the Degrees of Operating and Financial Leverage,” Financial 
Management 11, 15-23. 
 
Grant, R. (1996), ‘Toward a knowledge based view of the firm’, Strategic 
Management Journal, 17, pp.109-122. 
 
Gonedes, N.J. (1973), ‘Evidence on the information content of accounting numbers: 
Accounting-based and market-based estimates of systematic risk, Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 8(3), pp.407-433. 
 
Gonedes, N.J. (1975), ‘A note on accounting-based and market-based estimates of 
systematic risk’, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 10(2), 
pp.355-365. 
 
Hamada, R.S. (1969), ‘Portfolio analysis, market equilibrium and corporation 
finance’, Journal of Finance, pp.13-31. 
 
Hamada, R.S. (1972), ‘The effect of the firm’s capital structure on the systematic risk 
of common stocks, Journal of Finance, pp.435-452. 
 21
Hill, N. and Stone, B., (1980), “Accounting Beta, Systematic Operating Risk, and 
Financial Leverage: A Risk-Composition Approach to the Determinants of 
Systematic Risk,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 15, 595-
637. 
 
Huffman, L., (1983), “Operating Leverage, Financial Leverage and Equity Risk,” 
Journal of Banking & Finance 7 (2), 197-212.  
 
Huffman, S.P., (1989), “The Impact of the Degrees of Operating and Financial 
Leverage on the Systematic Risk of Common Stocks: Another Look,” 
Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics. 28(1); 83-100. 
 
Koutsoyiannis, A., (1987), Non-Price Decisions the Firm in a Modern Context, 
Hongkong: MacMillan Education Ltd 
 
Lazonick, W. (1991) Business Organization and the myth of the market economy, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Lev, B., (1974), “On the Association Between Operating Leverage and Risk,” Journal 
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 9, 627-641. 
 
Li, R-J and Henderson, G. (1991), ‘Combined Leverage and Stock Risk’, Quarterly 
Journal of Business and Economics, Vol.30, No.1, pp.18-40. 
 
Lord. R.A., (1996), “The Impact of Operating and Financial Risk on Equity Risk,” 
Journal of Economic and Finance 20 (3), 27-38. 
 
Mandelker, G.N. and Rhee, S.G., (1984), The Impact of the Degrees of Operating and 
Financial Leverage on Systematic Risk of Common Stock” Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis Vol.19, No.1, pp.45-57. 
 
Miller, M., 1977, “Debt and Taxes,” Journal of Finance 32, 266-68. 
 22
Modigliani, F. and Miller, M. (1958), ‘The cost of capital, corporation finance and the 
theory of investment, American Economic Review, pp.261-297.  
 
Modigliani, F., and Miller, M., (1963), “Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of 
Capital: A Correction,” American Economic Review 53, 433-43. 
 
Mohr, R., 1985, “The Operating Beta of a U.S. Multi-Activity Firm: An Empirical 
Investigation,” Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 575-593 
 
O’Hanlon, J. and Steele, A. (2000), ‘Estimating the equity risk premium using 
accounting fundamentals’, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 
Vol.27, pp.1051-1083. 
 
O’Brien, T.J. and Vanderheiden, P.A., 1987, “Empirical Measurement of Operating 
Leverage for Growing Firms,” Financial Management 16 (2), 45-53. 
 
Prezas, A.P., 1987, “The Effect of Debt on the Degrees of Operating and Financial 
Leverage,” Financial Management 16(2), 39-44. 
 
Rosenberg, B. and Guy, J., (1976), “Prediction of Beta from Investment 
Fundamentals,” Financial Analysts Journal (July/August 1976) 
 
Rosenberg. B and Rudd, A., (1982), “The Corporate Uses of Beta,” Chase Financial 
Quarterly 1 (4). 
 
Rubinstein, M.E. (1973), ‘A mean-variance synthesis of corporation finance theory’, 
Journal of Finance, pp.167-181. 
 
Thompson, J.D., 1976, “Sources of Systematic Risk in Common Stocks,” Journal of 
Business 49, 173-188. 
 
UKNA (United Kingdom National Accounts), (2005), Blue Book, London: HMSO. 
 
 23
Watson, D. and Head, A. (1998) Corporate Finance: Principles and Practice, 
London: Pitman. 
 
White, H. (1980), ‘A heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance estimator and a direct 
test for heteroscedasticity, Econometrica, Vol. 48, pp.817-38. 
 24
  
 
                                                 
1 Because the denominator is the same for all firms DOL(C)i and βci can be used inter-
changeably in cross sectional analysis. 
 
2 These figures imply leverage from operating fixed costs of 1.60, computed as the 
ratio of change in profit to change in sales. Variable cost (VC) = Sales – (DOL x ∏). 
Fixed cost = total cost – VC.  
 
3 This period may also differ from or be constrained by the estimation period for 
financial betas. DataStream’s and LBS’s betas are estimated over a 5-year period. 
 
4 β = DY + G/ (Rm – Rf) where DY is dividend yield. 
 
5 In Datastream, items Earned for ordinary (625) and Total share capital and reserves 
(307) are used as measures for profits after tax and equity respectively.  
 25
